Abstract: There is growing interest in the influence of economic "haves" and "have-nots" on public policy. In a widely referenced article, compare the influence of upper and middle-income citizens and find that the preferences of the former are all that matter for policy. Here, we reconsider this possibility, examining how often the rich win and the kinds of policies they get. We find that the rich and middle almost always agree and, when they disagree, the rich win only slightly more often. Even when the rich do win, resulting policies do not lean point systematically in a conservative direction. Incorporating the preferences of the poor produces similar results; though the poor do not fare as well, their preferences are not completely dominated by those of the rich or middle. Based on our results, it appears that inequalities in policy representation across income groups are limited. The rich still do matter, seemingly more than they should, and this may have substantial consequences for policy, particularly as effects cumulate over time. It also may be that income does not matter very much, and that other divisions in the electorate or other actors are more relevant for policy.
suggests that policy is responsive primarily, or even solely, to the richest Americans, at the expense of the middle class and poor. 2 The finding of such pronounced inequality in political representation clearly contrasts with the normative basis for representative democracy. It is not entirely surprising, however.
The rich have more time and money to give to campaigns, and politics more generally. 3 They also tend to vote more often, and evidence suggests that voters are better represented than nonvoters. 4 That the rich are better represented than the poor is what we might therefore expect. For similar reasons, we might expect that the middle also are better represented than the poor.
Perhaps more surprising would be that the rich are better represented than the middle.
The median voter carries special importance in representative democracy. 5 To the extent that governments react to voters, they should be especially responsive to the middle; it is tyranny of the majority that is the major concern in classic empirical democratic theory, after all. 6 Yet recent research by argues that the preferences of average-income Americans play only a marginal role in the formation of policy. Indeed, they claim that, "When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose." 7 Scholars who find differences in policy representation across groups focus on a model that looks like the following:
where P represents a proposed policy in issue area j, represents the opinion of medium income Americans, and ℎ represents the preferences of high income
Americans. Here, policy is a function of the preferences of middle and high income Americans, and analysis gauges the relative contribution of each. Gilens and Page (2014) present work along these lines, and find that ℎ completely dominates . Note that their results clearly indicate responsiveness to the rich, but not actual congruence between preferences and policies. That is, one cannot tell based from the results whether the rich actually get what they want. 8 The paper has nevertheless motivated a good deal of scholarly and public discussion about the possibility that policy is responsive primarily to the preferences of the rich.
We consider this issue below. Our analysis is heavily influenced by the possibility that ℎ and are often not very different. Indeed, previous research already has shown that preferences across economic groups, and especially the middle and rich, do not differ much in many policy areas. 9 In these instances, it does not matter whether the government is more reactive to one group -policy will end up in the same place. This is not to say that it does not matter theoretically, of course -we would ideally want governments to react to all citizens. 10 We are acknowledging here only that it does not matter practically, as there will be no substantive difference in policy outputs.
Strong agreement between income cohorts thus complicates an analysis of unequal representation, making it difficult to identify the target of responsiveness. 11 The consequences of highly correlated independent variables for regression analysis are well known in the statistical literature, after all. 12 We thus propose focusing on the subset of polices for which there is disagreement across majorities of middle and high income citizens. We derive this subset from
Gilens's dataset, made available through the Russell Sage Foundation website, which is the same dataset used by Gilens and Page; 13 it provides public preferences imputed across income percentiles for a wide range of specific policies.
14 By adopting this approach, our analysis directly addresses the central conclusion of the Gilens and Page paper, namely, "when a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites." 15 We would argue that this is the set of policies that is of greatest theoretical interest as well, as it allows us to more directly assess policy congruence with opinion. We accordingly use these data to consider two crucial questions:
 How often do the preferences of the middle and rich disagree?
 When they disagree, who wins?
The analysis proceeds as follows. We first compare the preferences of the rich and the middle, and find the rich and middle rarely disagree; in nearly 90 percent of cases, majorities of the middle and rich are in agreement. Next, we investigate what happens when the two groups disagree, and find that the rich win more often than the middle, though not strikingly -or significantly -so. We then consider the kinds of policies on which the rich and middle win. Our suspicion is that readers of Gilens and Page (and related work) have been drawing the inference that the rich advocate and win on conservative policies that give them economic advantages, such as tax cuts, over the objections of the middle (and poor). We find very little evidence to support such an inference, however. Finally, we bring the preferences of the poor into the analysis, the results of which indicate that the poor do slightly worse than the other income groups, though even they occasionally win over the preferences of the middle or the rich. What inequality we do observe here appears to come mostly from negative power, where the middle and rich effectively block many of the policies favored by the poor.
THE MIDDLE AND THE RICH
As noted above, the potential for unequal policy representation depends on differences in preferences between income groups. Let us consider differences using Gilens's dataset. The data include responses to 1,863 survey questions about potential policies over the 1981-2002 period.
Of those, 84 have mixed outcomes, where the policy in question was partly adopted. Following Gilens, we drop these partially adopted policies. This means that our analysis rests on the same 1,779 policies that Gilens and Page analyze. 16 Gilens estimates levels of support for each of these policies across various income percentiles using observed information about support among income groups. 17 For our analysis, we focus on the support of those at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles, the same percentiles used by Gilens. 18 Relying on imputed data limits what we can infer, but the nature of the opinion data, in which income questions vary in both response categories and availability, makes the imputation necessary. And relying on Gilens's imputations has the added advantage of allowing us to assess the structure of preferences that formed the basis for what is perhaps the most influential political science article on political inequality to date.
[ Figure 1 about here] the two groups' preferences are identical, and thus also distinguishes between policies that receive more support from the rich (above the line) from policies that receive more support from the middle (below the line).
As Gilens and Page note, preferences are very highly correlated. The Pearson's r between the two is a striking 0.94. Gilens and Page report that the correlation drops to 0.78 when adjusting for correlated measurement error, though it is unclear whether we are dealing with correlated measurement error or simply correlated preferences; see analysis and discussion in the Appendix, and . 19 This complicates regression analysis, as discussed above.
Although we do not use regression in our main analysis, we do present results paralleling Gilens and Page's methodology in the Appendix. Those results support the findings we present in the body of the paper. They really are beside our main point, however, as regression analysis offers only limited information about how often groups actually win.
It is clear from Figure 1 that there is a positive relationship between (a) the preferences of both the middle and rich and (b) government action. In the lower-left corner, policies without support from either the middle or the rich are likely to fail, indicated by the predominance of gray dots, though some of these still pass. In the upper-right corner, policies with support from both the middle and rich are more likely to succeed, though many of these fail as well.
Consistent with previous research, the relationship between opinion and policy is far from perfect.
[ Table 1 about here]
The spread of points in Figure 1 also indicates that, while the relationship between middle and rich preferences is strong, it is not perfect. Table 1 provides an alternative analysis of the same data, focused on majority support or opposition among the high and middle income groups using 50 percent as the cut-point between support and opposition. Here we can see that the rich and middle agree on 1,594 policies: the 616 that both groups oppose, and the 978 that both groups favor. This amounts to 89.6 percent of the 1,799 policies. To be clear: although the magnitude of support may differ across the middle and rich, on 89.6 percent of these policies there is majority support, or majority opposition, in both income groups. On all of these policies, an analysis of "majoritarian congruence" would predict exactly the same outcome.
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A majority of the middle disagree with a majority of the rich on just 185 policies -78 that the middle favor and the rich do not, and 107 that the rich favor but the middle do not.
Although this is not evident in the there are also 185 instances in which the middle and rich clearly disagree. These are the policies that allow us to assess whose preferences win out in the policymaking process.
This raises an important difference between our analyses and that of Gilens and Page (2014): whereas their work examines the magnitude of support in both income groups, we focus here on dichotomous majority support (within each income group). This has implications for tests of influence. For instance, where both the middle and the rich agree, policies are about 10
percentage points more likely to be passed (or blocked) if support from the rich is greater (less)
than support from the middle; see Appendix Table A1 . This may help explain why Gilens and Page (2014) find evidence in their regression analyses for the rich winning over the middle; see the additional analyses and discussion related to Appendix Table A3 .
21
Our interest is in addressing what happens when the middle and rich disagree, and we thus do not consider this dichotomous approach as contentious -indeed, we regard it as a more appropriate way of linking preferences with the passage or failure of policies. The approach fits with a large body of previous work on policy congruence, which focuses on the passage of policies and their match with opinion majorities. 22 Perhaps most importantly, it directly addresses what Gilens and Page conclude on the basis of their results, namely, that when a majority of citizens disagree with economic elites, they generally lose. 23 We now turn to testing that proposition. Figure 2 illustrates the way in which we narrow the dataset. The 1,594 policies on which the middle and rich agree cannot provide any leverage on questions about differential representation -these polices are shown here as light gray circles. The remaining 185 policiesinstances in which a majority of one group supports the policy while a majority of the other does not -can offer direct information about inequalities in representation. As we have seen, there are 78 cases in which the middle favors the policy but the rich oppose it. These are the cases below the dashed line, illustrated as black squares for policies that passed, and gray squares for policies that failed. Above the dashed line there are the 107 cases, illustrated in the same way, in which a majority of the rich favors the bill while a majority of the middle opposes it. Note that based on these numbers, when preferences differ, it is more often the case that the rich favor passage and the middle prefer the status quo.
WHO WINS WHEN THE MIDDLE AND THE RICH DISAGREE?
[ Figure 2 about here]
What happens when preferences differ? Just how often do the rich win? We can see in Figure 2 that the rich do not always win: there is a mix of both gray and black on both sides of the dashed line. A win for the rich over the middle can occur in two ways. The first is where a majority of the rich support the policy and the policy passes. These are the aforementioned black squares above the line in Figure 2 . The second is where a majority of the rich oppose the policy and the policy fails. These instances are indicated by the gray squares below the line in Figure 2 .
This sort of negative power can be quite powerful in the political arena. Our analysis must focus, then, on a combination of these positive and negative wins. Table 2 rearranges our cases in a way that clarifies how often -and how -each group wins The first two columns show the number of policies favored by the middle (first column) or the rich (second column). Rows split these policies according to whether the middle or rich won. There are 20 policies that received majority support from middle-income respondents (and majority opposition from the rich) and passed. By contrast, there are 58 policies that were favored by the middle (and opposed by the rich) and did not pass. In the former cases, the middle won; in the latter, the rich won. Taking into account the first and second columns, the third column reports the total number of wins for each group. For the middle, there are 87 wins (47 percent of all cases); for the rich, 98 wins (53 percent of all cases). There is a small gap in win rates, but note that it is not significantly different from 50 percent (p = 0.41).
[ It is well known that it is harder to pass legislation in the United States than block it, and it is important to consider how this matters. When doing so, the rich do slightly better. If a majority of the rich favor a policy and a majority of the middle opposes, the policy is adopted 37% of the time; by contrast, when the middle favor a policy and the rich are opposed, the policy is adopted 26% of the time. The difference also is statistically significant (p = 0.05). Although the rich do slightly better here, they clearly do not dominate the middle.
Over the 22-year period of the study, the rich won just 11 more times than the middle;
this is equivalent to the rich netting one bill every other year. 25 Admittedly, this does not include all policy decisions taken, but it should include those salient, seemingly important ones -these are the policies about which survey organizations ask, after all. 26 These results thus do not provide evidence of high-income dominance of American politics. The rich are systematically overrepresented, it seems, just not by much. Of course, small differences in the number of policies can make a difference, particularly as they accumulate over time. 27 This is more difficult to measure. We can, however, gain some sense of the accumulating policy impact by assessing the ideological orientation of the policies on which the rich and middle win.
THE IDEOLOGICAL DISPOSITION OF POLICY WINS
To what extent do rich wins push policy in a conservative direction? The answer to this question is significant. If rich wins always result in conservative policy, then they can make a rather large difference over time. We suspect that this is the inference many readers of recent scholarship have drawn. To our knowledge, however, this has not been systematically analyzed.
And it is not necessarily the case that all rich wins result in conservative policy. After all, we know that income is positively related to education, and while the former can push individuals towards the right, the latter can sometimes push towards the left. 28 This has been wellestablished in work on public opinion, and it may help explain why several of the rich wins in these data actually lead to leftward policy shifts. For example, a majority of the rich supported expanding access to abortion via the French abortion pill RU-486; even though the middle were opposed, the policy changed.
We thus explore the ideology of policies directly by coding the 185 where the middle and rich disagree. Incomplete data forces us to drop 19 cases, leaving 166 observations in the analysis; see the Appendix for details. These 166 policies are coded for ideological direction by the authors, as the ideological direction of most policies is relatively clear. Policies that expand the size or scope of government, including raising revenue, are coded as ideologically liberal.
Social issues also are coded according to their ideological location at that time. So, for example, conservative policies include enacting NAFTA or restricting access to abortion or birth control;
liberal policies include tax increases and affirmative action policies. Our coding allows for ideologically neutral policies as well; these tend to be concerned with foreign affairs and defense.
[ Figure 3 about here]
The breakdown of these policies is shown in Figure 3 conservative polices -only slightly greater than the number of non-ideological policies. One concern not addressed here is that the wealthy are especially successful with economic policies, but there is no evidence for this in the data; see the Appendix for a brief analysis.
In sum, since the rich win more than the middle (see Table 2 ), and since they prefer policies to the right (Figure 3 ), policy change is more conservative than it would be otherwise.
The difference in any given year is small: of the 91 ideologically-coded policies for which the rich won, only 15 of those pushed the status quo in a conservative direction. This represents a minority (28 percent) of policies that the rich passed over the objections of the middle; and it represents less than one conservative policy per year in the sample. Even so, as we have noted, such seemingly small annual differences may accumulate and have big effects over time.
BRINGING THE POOR BACK IN
The mathematics of representative democracy suggest that policy should follow middle- Analysis incorporating the poor reveals broad policy agreement among all three groups.
Indeed, majorities of all three groups agree on 80.2 percent of the policies. That said, the variation between the poor and rich is much greater than that between the poor and middle. The
Pearson's r correlation for the preferences of the poor and rich is 0.84, whereas the correlation between the poor and middle is 0.93. Recall from above that the correlation between the middle and rich is 0.94. So the poor and middle are roughly correlated to the same degree as the middle and rich. But what happens when they disagree?
[ Table 3 about here] Table 3 shows the passage rate of policies for different combinations of support among the poor, middle and rich. Note that this table includes the entire Gilens dataset, not just the subset previously analyzed. The top half of the table shows policies for which either all three income groups are opposed (the first row), or only one of the three groups supports the policy.
As we can see, even if a majority of all three groups are opposed to the policy, it still passes roughly 24 percent of the time. If the middle or rich want the policy, it passes more often, though still not most of the time. Even so, support from just the middle or rich seems to lead to bill passage more reliably (37.5 percent and 38.5 percent respectively) than if just the poor support the bill (18.6 percent). Indeed, the passage rate for policies supported by just the poor is lower than the rate for bill unsupported by all groups (although this difference is not statistically significant). These results suggest that the rich and middle may be effective at blocking policies that the poor want.
The bottom half of Table 3 shows what happens when various combinations of income groups support passage. Even if a majority of all three groups favor a policy (in the final row), that bill passes only 40 percent of the time. The rich seem most effective at blocking policies they do not want -if a majority of the middle and poor want a policy, and the rich do not, the passage rate (20.4 percent) is comparable to the rate when all three groups are opposed. The rich do fare the best, but the middle do only slightly worse. Perhaps most notably, adding the support of the poor does not increase passage rates very much.
It is not the case that the preferences of one income group totally dominate policymaking.
The rich do slightly better than the middle, and the poor are least successful. But, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that all three income groups agree on the vast majority of cases, more than 80 percent, and the differences in success rates when there is disagreement are not great.
There are inequalities to be sure, but they are limited.
DISCUSSION: WHO WINS?
Recent research suggests that U.S. policy is only responsive to the preferences of high income citizens. Does this mean that the rich always get the policies they want? That the middle (and poor) always lose? We know that disagreement in policy preferences is a necessary condition for differential representation. If majorities in different income cohorts prefer the same policy, we cannot distinguish whose preferences are being represented. The government might follow the rich, or the middle, or even the poor, but policy will end at the same place. To assess the extent of differential representation, then, we have examined policies where there is disagreement between majorities in different income groups.
Results suggest that across a wide range of policies, disagreement on policy across income groups is rare. The preferences of rich, poor, and middle income Americans are correlated at what we regard as astonishingly high rates. That said, income groups do not agree on all policies, and we find that when the rich and middle disagree, it is nearly a coin flip as to which group wins. Although this may be more encouraging (normatively speaking) than recent scholarship, a 50-50 split between the 50th and 90th income percentiles is not an especially equal
result, given what the median voter theorem would expect. If middle-income wins tend to move policy closer to the median voter, then these high-income wins will tend to move policy further away. The poor seem to do less well than both of the other groups at getting policies they want passed, though the poor are often successful at blocking policies they dislike.
The potential impact of high-income wins may be at its greatest if the rich pass policies in one ideological direction. This is not what we observe, however. There is only a slight rightleaning bias in adopted policies that were supported by the rich and opposed by the middle. Our emphasis is on the troubling structure of public preferences for social welfare policy. 29 Alternatively, it may be that income is not the most salient cleavage where policy preferences are concerned, or at least that there are many other competing cleavages. This too is another subject for future work -and an important one for those interested in inequalities in policy representation in the United States.
APPENDIX

Details on Coding Ideology
The full text of some survey questions is not readily available in the Gilens Table A1 shows policy passage for policies that are jointly supported or opposed by the rich and the middle, across varying strengths of policy support or opposition by income group.
The Strength of Policy Support and Policy Adoption
For issues in the two leftmost columns, both the rich and the middle supported the policy. For issues on the right, both groups opposed it. Note that when majorities of both groups agree (are either both opposed or both supportive), the rich are 10 percent more likely to be in greater support or opposition. This may help account for why scholars find differences in policy representation using regression-based methods. Also see the analysis in Table A3 and the associated discussion below.
[ Table A1 about here]
Policy Support and Adoption for Economic and Social Issues
Issues coded in Gilens's original dataset as pertaining to the budget, economy and labor, and taxation were recoded as economic issues. Defense and terrorism were omitted, and all other issue areas were coded as social issues. Table A2 reproduces the analysis in Table 2 separating out just these re-coded policies. Note that the win rates for the two issue types are not statistically different from one another.
[ Table A2 about here]
Analysis using Regression
As noted above, regression may not be the best way to analyze these data, as it can give misleading results when the independent variables are highly correlated. 30 One published article posits that Gilens and Page's analyses are questionable for this very reason. 31 This is part of the rationale for our alternative approach. That being said, some readers may be interested in whether our results are the product of a change in the method of analysis, rather than a focus on the subset of cases in which rich and middle-income preferences diverge. We accordingly examine this possibility below.
We begin by reproducing the main result from Gilens and Page's article ( Table 3 in that paper), using structural equation modeling to correct for measurement error. It is not clear (to us) that this is the correct approach with these data, as it may be that we are dealing with correlated preferences and not correlated errors, 32 and the choice makes a difference, as we can see from
Gilens and Page's own analysis. To allow for both possibilities, we report results using the structural equation modeling approach as well as non-structural equation modeling. The substantive message is the same in each case: when we subset the data to only those observations where the rich and the middle disagree, it is unclear whose preferences matter, Results are presented in Table A3 . [ Table A3 about here]
Results from these regression-based models, SEM and non-SEM alike, are similar: all indicate that when we subset the data to only the cases where the rich and the middle disagree, we cannot tell whether rich or middle income preferences make any difference whatsoever to policy outputs. This is as true when we treat the dependent variable as interval-level (Models 3 and 5) or binary (Models 4 and 6); it is also as true in SEMs (Models 1 through 4) as in nonSEMs (Models 5 and 6).
In sum, results suggest that Gilens and Page's results are driven primarily by differences in opinion on policies for which majorities of the rich and middle agree. In other words, it is not whether (and how much) the rich and middle disagree, but how much the rich and middle differ when they agree, that mostly matters for the Gilens and Page findings.
An Additional Regression-Based Approach
An alternative way to explore the relative impact of the middle and the rich is to create a new variable that represents the difference between support of the rich and support of the middle. Table A4 presents the results of such an analysis. There we can see that the approach produces the same basic findings as preceding analyses. The opinion of the rich does seem to matter more for policy passage, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with "difference." However, it only matters when the rich and the middle happen to agree: when the two groups disagree, the marginal effect of "difference" on policy change drops to 0.80 (1.06-0.26) and is not statistically significant (p = 0.13).
[ Table A4 about here]
There are some problems associated with this approach, however. For example, it cannot distinguish between majority support or opposition -it treats 60 percent of the rich favoring something and 40 percent of the middle the same as 40 percent of the rich and 20 percent of the middle, even though these are clearly very different situations. It also cannot account for the kind of status quo bias that we address in our main analysis. One possible way of addressing these shortcomings is to include middle (or rich) opinion in the model. Then, the "difference" variable will capture the effect of the difference in support controlling for the actual level of support.
Doing this makes little difference, the results of which are reported in the second column of Table A4 . There it is clear that when middle income opinion is included and both it and the interest group variable are interacted with disagreement, the estimated effect of the preference difference when the two groups disagree is larger (1.38) but more unreliable (p = 0.23).
Figure 2. Issues where People with High and Middle Incomes Disagree
Source: Authors' analysis of Gilens data Source: Authors' analysis of Gilens's data. This is the subset of all policies where the middle and the rich disagree. Thus, there are 20 policies that a majority of the middle want that a majority of the rich do not. The win rate is calculated by taking the group's total wins divided by the total number of policies (n=185). The passage rate is calculated by taking the proportion of policies that passed in each row. The two rows represent whether policies were passed or not. The four cells on the left are policies that a majority of both the rich and middle support, the four cells on the right are policies that both opposed. Source: Authors' analysis of Gilens data. This shows the policies that the rich and middle disagree on (the subset highlighted in Figure 2 ) broken down by economic issues (left side) and social issues (right side). The economic win rate is calculated by taking the total of that group's wins divided by the total number of economic issues that the two groups disagree on. The rich's win rate for economic issues is 57.1% and on social issues is 51.1%. A two-tailed difference of proportions test does not find a statistically significant difference between the win rates across the two groups of policies (p = 0.738). * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. Predictors are the logits of the imputed percent of respondents in favor of the policy at the 50th and 90th income percentiles. The interest group variable was created as described by . All predictors have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Model 1 is the replication of Gilens and Page (2014), estimated using their methodology on the whole data. Model 2 uses the same methodology but subsetting to just the 1594 observations where the rich and middle agree. Model 3 uses the same methodology but subsetting to just the 185 observations where the rich and middle disagree. Model 4 replicates Model 3 explicitly taking into account the binary nature of the dependent variable using asymptotic distribution free standard errors. Model 5 re-estimates model 3 using simple OLS. Model 6 re-estimates the model once again using probit and no structural equation modeling. Predictors are the logits of the imputed percent of respondents in favor of the policy at the 50th and 90th income percentiles. The interest group variable was created as described by Gilens and Page (2014). All predictors have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1.
